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10 FEB 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/DCI/NIPE

SUBJECT: Intelligence Planning Guidance
for the 1970's

REFERENCE: Memorandum dated 23 January 1970,
Subject as above

1. We appreciate being invited to comment on this forward-looking paper and hope that the comments which follow can contribute toward making an even more well-rounded projection. In the main we believe that such Community steps as are proposed here, if generally accepted and realistically and purposefully undertaken, can contribute significantly toward solutions to the complex problems which the U.S. Intelligence Community is and will be facing in the 70's. That Community must come to planning and acting more in concert if it is to serve successfully the ends of national security, not the least of which is more effective and more efficient use of the resources made available to it.

2. We feel that this paper is overbalanced on the great issues of a hot war, anxious about early warning and strategic armaments and their misuse. While one could not successfully argue with the statement (paragraph 139c) that "The consequences of a failure to provide effective warning of military action or a technological breakthrough by the USSR or Communist China are so potentially disastrous that a continuing high level of effort in this field is essential.", we tend to accept the view stated in the Planning Assumptions and Parts I and II of this paper that a hot war does not seem to be in the cards. Instead, grave forces having balanced each other off for the foreseeable future, we are left with Soviet Bloc exploitation of the

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festerling social and political sores lying around the world, or at our door step (i.e., Latin America), or unfortunately right here at home. It is always important to remember that Communists see politics through economic and social questions and see our humbling through exploitation of these insidious factors. It only reinforces their approach that it is far better and safer to try such avenues than to resort to the use of strategic weapons. It would seem to follow that a distortion of the Intelligence Community to overendow early warning with resources and starve our monitoring and combatting of these other situations would be a dinosaur's decision--a failure to adapt to the environment.

3. While the Clandestine Service of the CIA, as one part of the Intelligence Community, is not planning to seek significantly increasing resources over the next several years, we do believe that in our unique role as the statutory arm of the Federal Government for clandestine foreign intelligence and counterintelligence we have the capability for a major contribution to the monitoring and combatting mentioned above and thus to the intelligence needs of our Government in the years ahead. Some of the obstacles we foresee (and toward resolution of which we are working) are: a system of resource allocation which in the main is excellent but which is also largely insensitive to the needs and realities of the Federal foreign intelligence service; the expansion of non-CIA controlled ventures into the clandestine foreign intelligence and counterintelligence areas; the freezing of overseas presence as of an arbitrary date in the past which denies that very degree of flexibility which could make more effective use of limited resources against changing needs; and the continuing assignment of additional tasks without reference to the limits or deployment of resources.

4. Even though we do not foresee a hot war situation developing, we believe the priority given to collection activities against Soviet and Chinese advanced weapons systems is, on balance, right and especially for our highly successful photographic reconnaissance and technical collection systems. However, looking ahead, we do foresee that the continued high success of these systems against weapons' capabilities and accompanying analyses will result in a

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continued refinement of the weapons' capability requirement and an increased need for intelligence on plans and intentions to use such weapons. It is against these requirements for refined weapons' capabilities and plans and intentions that we believe human source collection must make its principal contribution. It is against these requirements, in addition to the myriad of lesser priority requirements that will undoubtedly emerge, that we will direct the energy of the Clandestine Service.

5. It occurs to us that since the USIB has not traditionally been concerned with resource levels and allocations perhaps the recently created NIRB might better be the focal point for consideration and management of the Community efforts called for in this document.

6. Re several specific items in the draft, by paragraph number where appropriate:

a. Page 42 B Ordering of Requirements. Under this heading there seems to be a basic omission, i.e., NSCID 5, especially as it pertains to counterintelligence. The entire Part IV scarcely pays lip service to this vital area of CS activity. The counterintelligence problems of the 70's certainly will be no less than those of the past and in our view they will be greater. Inadequate defense against disinformation would leave U.S. policies vulnerable to manipulation, to cite but one example. While we hasten to add that the CI mission is largely a CIA as opposed to a Community responsibility, CI awareness is everybody's business. Hence we believe the paper should at least refer to NSCID 5.

b. In general the CA field and the area of paramilitary activity are fundamentally the business of CIA, not that of the Community, but a valuable by-product of such actions is frequently significant intelligence. Thought might be given to the inclusion in this paper of some comment on the CIA role in CA/PM affairs where collection can be important. We are in no way suggesting opening any doors for non-CIA participation in NSCID 5412 matters, but perhaps it would be appropriate in this downstream look to acknowledge that resources, frequently

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substantial, must be planned for. Also some collection by-product can be expected from such activities.

c. In specific reference to paragraph 139a (p. 50), we believe this vital point of planning should be stressed even more. Surely the Community's past experience points up the fact that the USG can no longer afford an intelligence establishment the philosophy of which is re-active. This paper itself is evidence of that truism. The international world of the 70's and beyond will not wait for the Community to catch up and the call for systematic planning, late though it already is, needs an even stronger voice. Modern management techniques and tools are available and those useful should be embraced. While they can never be substitutes for experience, judgment and intuition, they can make all three of these more valuable and productive.

d. Re paragraph 143 (p. 60) penultimate sentence: we referred to this in paragraph 3 above, but wish to state here our concurrence in the essential nature of this statement. Until some effort is successful in delimiting the responsibilities placed on the Intelligence Community we will continue to flounder in a sea of requirements. Just because some other Executive arm fails to reach a certain overt goal or find a pertinent overt fact is insufficient justification for constant add-on to the tasks of the Community. In a perfect world the Community should be supplying those vital and few missing parts of a given puzzle; in the real world the tradition has been to lose the decision maker in a welter of irrelevant trivia with a possible gem hidden somewhere in the mass. (In this regard paragraph 137d (p. 49) could be strengthened to advantage. Savings could also be realized in paper, printing, distribution facilities, and some relief might be found for the already busy manager who at least tries to be aware of it all.)

e. In respect to the SIGINT aspects of this paper, it is to be expected that, should the paper be submitted to the USIB, NSA would desire to make some input. Insofar as the paper treats of CIA involvement in the SIGINT program, the paper seems adequate, but for the sake of accuracy and completeness:

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para 113, "establishing" in the second sentence should be "augmenting"

para 112, second sentence, insert "existing and" before "expected".



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f. Paragraph 139n (p. 56): where clandestine operations are concerned we should not reduce compartmentation on sensitive intelligence unless there is good reason to believe that such action will not increase the danger of unauthorized disclosure. Current mechanisms for handling leaks are controlled by the Security Committee of the USIB, but, despite the excellent work done by the Committee, departmental procedures remain inadequate to deal effectively with leaks. Education will not correct the inadequacies. The problem is far more complex than is reflected in this paragraph.

7. One attitude this paper seems to strike is an insufficient confidence in the existing value of the intelligence product to try to sell it or to seek less than our proportionate share of reductions in resource allocations. On the contrary this paper suggests that collectors and producers "accommodate to such constraints and, perhaps to even more stringent cutbacks...." (p. i of Introduction) in a climate where the "willingness of the U. S. Government to budget for intelligence activities will depend in considerable part upon the confidence which policy makers and the Congress have that important intelligence tasks are being well performed and that the end products are of top quality." (Para 126, p. 42). This impression of passiveness does not seem compatible with the importance of intelligence suggested in some

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portions of the Planning Assumptions (notably paras. 47-59 and to some extent 72-75 and 88-93). Nor does this passive attitude provide much psychological underpinning for attracting and retaining dedicated employees (para 139q, p. 57)-- or indeed for presenting a convincing case to support resource requests before the BOB.

8. Another attitude reflected here appears to be a concurrence in a continuation into the 70's of the military intelligence role as it has been during the 60's. Whether it is intended, there seems to be even greater emphasis on decentralization among the military collectors rather than consideration of the advantages of greater centralization. Also of concern is the lack of clarity (at least to us) of paragraph 139f, p. 52, re national and tactical intelligence resources and their control.

9. We were struck by the frequent use of the word "improve" throughout Part IV of this paper and thus wonder if readers might not conclude that there had been serious failures both in collection and in coordination of the Community's activities.



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